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The Se paration O f
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M i c h a e I H a r d t
One of the most fascinating and politically significant elements
in the recent public debates on welfare is the relationship between
labor and income or, really, between labor and the right or
entilementto income. The 1996 welfare reform and the abolition
of the AFDC program are most often cast explicitly as an effort to
reinforce or repair the social connection between labor and
income. In fact, the major criticisms of welfare programs since the
1960s and probably even the 1930s have in one way or another
centered around the fact that welfare programs such as AFDC de-
link labor from income. And indeed they do. The logic of welfare
programs such as these is that specific populations for specific
periods have a right or entitlement to an income despite the fact
they are not working. In this sense the argument for welfare is and
has always been posed as an exception to the normal link between
labor and income. The 1996 welfare reform along with the
various notions of work-fare are in essence efforts to close such
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exceptions and re-knit the ineluctable relation between labor and
income.
Resistances to workfare, that is, resistances to the mandate that
all who are to receive an income must work, often accept this
relation between labor and income and focus on the fate of the
working poor. Some will argue, quite rightly, that the U.S.
economy is not capable of providing jobs for all, that full
employment is contrary to the economy's normal functioning.
Others will focus on the kinds of jobs available and, quite rightly
again, observe how demeaning and deadening many of these jobs
are, and how poorly they are paid. This reasoning leads to an
alternative political position something like this: Yes, we want to
work, but we want good jobs that pay a decent wage and allow us
to live a good life.
That is a logical and reasonable political position, but I want
to explore a different route, one that is not based on the link
between labor and income. In fact, I would revise the res;ponse to
workfare programs I just presented by saying, No, we do not really
want jobs, we do not really want to work; what we want is a
decent income. Perhaps we do not need to accept the notion that
waged labor is the only route to an income. Perhaps too we can
leave behind all the moralism attached to work, with its
supposedly virtuous, character-building powers.
I am interested in the proposal of a guaranteed income
precisely because it represents an income independentof labor not
as the exception but as the rule. That would certainly be the
destruction of welfare as we know it. And furthermore it would
radically change our notion of labor. I am completely in
agreement in this regard with Lucy Williams when she insists that
we have to understand the connection between the politics of
welfare and the politics of wage work, or really the connection
between the critique of welfare and the critique of wage labor.1
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The proposal of a guaranteed income is the practical result of such
a critique.
The proposal of a guaranteed income might seem utopian or
unrealistic to some given the present political context in the United
States. We should remember that often political proposals that
appear utterly unrealistic come to seem absolutely necessary in a
very short period of time. There are now large debates in Europe,
particularly France and Italy, about possible schemas of guaranteed
income. And as recently as the Nixon Administration in the
United States there were proposals of a guaranteed income within
the government itself. More important, from my perspective, the
proposal itself of a guaranteed income, utopian or not, serves an
important ideological function-forcing us to question the work
ethic, our moral attachments to work, and re-evaluate the social
value and productivity of nonwork, that is, our creative activities
outside of wage labor.
This is not the time or place to articulate the specifics of what
such guaranteed or basic income would entail. In broad terms, I
am thinking of an income paid universally to everyone in the
society that is sufficiently large for a person to live decently. It
might be better, then, to call it a citizenship income. The income
would be paid without regard to work, so that any income derived
from paid labor or other incomes would be added to it. What is
important for us here, however, is not the practical specifics but
the fundamental theoretical operation of any such schema: the
separation of income from labor.
Labor
and
Income
There is, of course, nothing necessary in a trans-historical
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sense about the link between labor and income. It would be
interesting and useful to embark on an anthropological analysis of
the schemas of the distribution of wealth in non-capitalist social
formations on the basis of kinship relations, social prestige, and so
forth-not to emulate their models but simply to denaturalize the
link that exists in our society between labor and income. What
such an analysis would reveal is that the notion that income is
based on the quantity and quality of labor is proper and specific to
capitalist society and capitalist ideology. Throughout the history of
capitalist societies, the hierarchies of income have been
understood as corresponding to levels of labor and productivity.
(And we should note that socialist ideologies - from social
democracy to State socialism - are perfectly in line with this
capitalist notion.)
"He who does notwork, shall not eat" poses the bottom limit.
Labor grants us the right to an income; poverty and starvation are
the threatening whips that guarantee our work ethic. And then,
still according to capitalist ideology, the labor-time and the
productivity of different individuals are the rationale for the
hierarchy of incomes. As the old slogan goes, "for an equal
quantity of labor, an equal quantity of products." For a negative
demonstration of this foundation of income on labor, we can go
back to welfare as we used to know it. Welfare, as I said, was in
essence an exception to this rule, which was certainly part of the
ideological motivation driving its abolition.
In more general terms we can say that the right or entitlement
to an income, like indeed a whole series of rights, is grounded on
labor in capitalist society. Precisely because this is the functional
logic that founds such rights, I think the most powerful avenue for
critical legal study is by means of labor right, that is, using the logic
of capitalist ideology itself. In other words, some argue for a
citizenship income, or some such right to a basic income that is
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol5/iss1/3
25 Hardt
separated from labor, on the basis of a logic that is outside of
capital. Some maintain, for example, that a universal basic income
is justified by our sense of charity or our social duty to the poor.
Others support a guaranteed income as a form of compensation
since the capitalist economy cannot provide full employment. I
want to advocate a citizenship income, instead, on the basis of the
notion of labor right and the logic of capital itself. In other words,
I maintain that the changes in the contemporary economy-the
postfordist regime of production, the predominance of immaterial
forms of labor, and the consequent transformations of the social
working day-lead labor right to support a basic income separated
from labor. By focusing on today's changing nature of labor and
production, I want to work through the logic of capital, take it to
its logical conclusion, and come out the other side.
What is needed at this point is an analysis of the recent
changes in capitalist production and labor. Here I can, of course,
give only a few brief indications in rather theoretical terms.2 The
general economic shift I am referring to can be summarized as the
passage from an economy centered on industrial production to
one in which the production of information and services hold the
dominant position. Jobs in this new paradigm have a shorter
guaranteed duration and require flexible skills. More importantly,
they are characterized in general by the central role played by
knowledge, information, communication, and affect. My claim, in
other words, which I cannot properly argue here, is that in today's
economy the dominant forms of labor are what I call immaterial
labor-knowledge labor, information labor, communication labor,
affective labor, and so forth. What this description might
immediately call to mind are the high level jobs that fit in this
category, such as software programmers and health care
professionals: programmers deal primarily with knowledge and
information and health care professionals are to a large extent
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involved in affective labor, creating a sense of well-being. I intend
this notion of immaterial labor, however, to apply also to low level
jobs, such as fast food workers. After all, affect is cleady a large
part of their jobs-service with a smile. What I want to emphasize
is that as a result of this economic shift a series of traditional
economic divisions have disappeared and consequently the
mechanisms of economic measure have disappeared too.
Within the context of a factory regime with a clearly defined
work day, the capitalist calculus linking an individual's labor-time
and productivity to a specific level of income could function to a
certain extent. Labor time and productivity in this context at least
seemed to be measurable for each individual in clear quantitative
terms. As the center of social production moves progressively
outside the factory, however, and as we pass from a Fordist to a
postfordist regime, toward the predominance of what I am calling
immaterial forms of labor, it is increasingly difficult to delimit and
measure the production of value in any such individualist
framework.
In fact, we can begin to see clearly now that it has always
been a mystification on the part of capitalist ideology that there is
any possible relationship of measure between the labor of an
individual and value. What we can see from the new forms of
labor and production is that production is not limited to the
working day. The time of production exceeds the time of labor
and actually fills the entire time of life. The working day is no
longer an adequate measure for the production of value. The
barriers thus decline that divided work from leisure or, as I like to
say, work from nonwork. Furthermore, it is increasingly clear that
the production of value is not individual but collective and social,
and thus cannot be located and measured in terms of the labor-
time of any individual or set of individuals. Knowledge,
information, communication, and affect are all produced socially
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and collectively in such away that their value cannot be measured
with respect to the labor of any individual.
Consider, for example, the creation of an advertising campaign
that uses a hip-hop theme. Does it make sense to locate the
source of that production in an individual advertising employee
and measure it in terms of the time sitting at his or her desk-when
in fact the idea was based on the rap music heard at the club the
night before? And it would be equally absurd to locate the
production in the individual rap artist playing atthe club when that
music developed in a musical idiom and subculture that is
produced and reproduced socially and collectively. In such a
case, no relation of measure can coherently linkvalue to the labor-
time of an individual or even a set of individuals.
If the production of value is collective and social and if the
time of production spreads throughout the time of life, then the
notion of an income that corresponds in measure to that
production cannot be limited to the working-day of an individual.
The only scale on which the calculus makes sense is that of the
society as a whole. In other words, if the labor is collective and
social, then the income must be equally collective and social.
Therefore, by pursuing the relation between labor and income to
its logical conclusion, we arrive at a social income, a citizenship
income, that paradoxically abolishes any relation between
individual labor and income, like a ladder that we can pull away
after we have climbed this far. The capitalist logic that links labor
to income cannot be measured except at the most general social
level-a general social income of citizenship that corresponds to
the general social productivity-in such a way that income is
divorced from any measure of the labor of the individual.
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2000
Vol. 5 2000 HYBRID 28
Global
Citizenship
When I propose the objective of a citizenship income, I want
also to question and deconstruct the notion of citizenship that
grounds it. I want to ask, in other words, what defines the limits
of this population that has a right to a guaranteed income? What
logic would limit this social income to the boundaries of the
nation-State? I would argue the proposal of a citizenship income
should be combined with a call for global citizenship because both
rely on the same conceptions of justice and equality, and
moreover both follow from the same analysis of the contemporary
changes in labor and production. That they follow from the same
logic, however, does not mean that their combination has no new
effects. Both are radical political proposals on their own, but, like
certain chemical reagents, whereas they are relatively stable while
kept separate, when combined they become explosive.
One can certainly argue for the right to global citizenship, like
a right to a social income, on the basis of a non-capitalist logic.
When, for example, PopeJohn XXIII in an encyclical letter claimed
that we are all members of the human family and thus citizens of
the world community, he grounded the right to global citizenship
on our common sense of charity and fraternity2. A stronger
argument, however, must pass through the dominant capitalist
logic in order to subvert it effectively. The right to citizenShip, like
entitlements to income, has been conceived throughout the
modern, capitalist era as a function of labor and production. The
wealth of a nation is produced by its citizens and conversely the
right to citizenship is predicated on the contribution of labor.
Immigration policies have thus closely followed labor markets and
the needs of national economies. When workers were needed to
build the great Western railroads in the United States, the nation
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welcomed a flood of Chinese laborers and then when no longer
needed barred all Chinese immigrants; similarly, workers from
Magreb were welcomed in France when their labor was needed
at the auto factories. The productivity of labor for the national
economy has always been the foundation of the right to
citizenship.
Given the recent processes of globalization and the
proliferation of transnational corporations, however, it may no
longer make sense to talk about national economies. Circuits of
production extend across the globe without respect to national
boundaries, so that different components of a single commodity,
such as an automobile or a computer, may be made by workers in
several different countries and on the basis of capital investments
from several other countries. In addition, within a single national
territory, workers with passports from numerous nations produce
together (legally and illegally). It is no longer possible to identify
any stable relation between the production of individual workers
and the wealth of single nation. And this calculation becomes
even more complex when we take into account the
immeasurability of immaterial labor and post-fordist production.
In the contemporary situation, then, when we pursue the
traditional capitalist logic whereby the right to citizenship is
founded on production for the nation, the only rational conclusion
is that all have the right to citizenship because global society as a
whole produces wealth collectively.
Catastrophe
and
Utopia
The proposals of a citizenship income and global citizenship
are likely to arouse fearful specters. It will be feared that some
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people will choose to live simply on the guaranteed income
without working and that the residents of the poor countries will
come live in our rich countries - or, in combination, that the poor
from around the world will come to live idly on our generous
handouts! That would be the end of our way of life as we know
it' Well, the fears of these new freedoms might be greatly
exaggerated. There are many reasons why people resist migration,
and would continue to do so even with global citizenship. We are
each tied to our local contexts by affective networks, family
relations, landscape, and many other factors. Migration always has
to overcome great resistances.
In the case of guaranteed income, there is no reason to
assume that we would cease to create and produce when income
is no longer linked to labor. There are enormous pleasures in
production and creativity that all too often eclipsed by the pain
and tedium of work. Here is where I think merely the proposal of
a separation of income from laborwould be enormously beneficial
for its destruction of the ideology of work. It would force us to
recognize the value and satisfaction of productive activity outside
of the confines of waged labor. It would force us to blur and
destroy the distinctions between work and nonwork.
Lucie White's analysis of Elaine Preston, a welfare recipient
who describes herself as lazy, is fascinating in this regard.4 Lucie
White points out rightly that laziness is a form of defense against
a series of bad options facing Elaine Preston. I would say, using
somewhat different terms, that laziness is an expression of the
refusal of work that extends throughout a variety of social
practices. Consider, for example, of Robin Kelley's description of
how he and his friends working at McDonalds moved on "CP"
time, colored people's time, a kind of laziness that was explicitly
conceived as a refusal of work that spread throughout the Black
U.S. working class.'
This kind of refusal of work, which I see consolidated
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juridically in a guaranteed income, must be accompanied by an
affirmation-an affirmation of social creativity and production
outside of wage work. The proposal or even establishment of a
guaranteed income would thus not be the end but only the point
of departure for this most important task.
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